As we approach the 10th anniversary of the World Summit Outcome now is the time to pause and ask the question what do scholars expect from the Responsibility to Protect? This article draws on non-Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) research into expectations to argue that in the aftermath of the intervention in Libya and non-intervention in Syria scholars have to manage RtoP expectations. In so doing, it introduces four types of expectations into the RtoP discourse: 'expectation gaps', 'expectation vacuums', 'expectation clouding', and 'inherited expectations' -the latter of which is this author's own contribution to the discourse. To illustrate the utility of the expectations approach, the article focuses on the debate over inconsistency in order to highlight the role of expectation gaps and inherited expectations.
moment. Even sceptics acknowledged how surprised they were to see such 'swift and robust' action, 2 despite dismissing its relationship with the RtoP. 3 The on-going crisis in Syria, however, led to claims that the RtoP is in fact dead, 'Syria marks the death of R2P as a viable, functional concept'. 4 Questioning whether its obituary is premature, analysts began to debate its demise. 5 Responding to this, Gareth Evans claimed that it is better to think in terms of a 'mid-life crisis' and that 'to evaluate how serious a mid-life crisis R2P might now be facing, we need to be very clear about what precisely were its intended scope and limits'.
6
Essentially, Evans' notion of a mid-life crisis attempts to offer a way out of what has become somewhat of an intellectual cul-de-sac. Undoubtedly shaped by norm life cycle theory, a rather crude birth/death narrative has surrounded the RtoP since its inception. 7 As Bellamy explains, 'From almost the day it was born, some analysts have been predicting the death of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle'. what can be done in order to address its limitations. For example, on February 23 rd 2011, Continetti questioned, 'Whatever happened to the "Responsibility to Protect"?', and argued that the lack of a UN response to the Libyan crisis evidenced that 'another foreign policy doctrine bites the dust'. 9 When one considers that this was written just eight days after the initial protests in Benghazi, one is left wondering what he was expecting to happen within such a short space of time? As we now know, just three days later the UN Security Council passed UN Resolution 1970. The example provides insight into the problem of overly high expectations as the RtoP is condemned for not producing an automatic response. As Welsh rightly argues, 'Whether or not international action actually occurs -particularly action involving military force -depends on a series of other factors, such as agreement on the facts (and what they signify) and the likelihood that military tools will have a positive effect'.
10
Having said this, the article also demonstrates that those that champion the RtoP, at least at times, have ratcheted up expectations of what the RtoP can achieve. Added to the complexity, the RtoP operates within an ever-changing political environment in which expectations of what can and cannot be achieved change. The objective of this article therefore is to connect a) the need to develop an understanding of the RtoP that is inherently more sensitive to its limitations and possibilities, with b) the question, how do we do this? At least a part of this is managing the expectations that surround the RtoP.
The article is structured in four sections. First, it draws on the work of Political Scientists that have studied expectations in order to put forward four concepts that will aid expectation management: 'expectations gaps', 'expectations clouds', 'expectations vacuums', and 'inherited expectations' -the latter is this author's own contribution to the discourse. Second, it offers a brief overview of the expectations that surround the RtoP to illustrate the need for an expectations approach within the RtoP discourse. Third, it evidences the added value of this approach by applying two of these concepts to one of the most prominent RtoP debates:
inconsistency. 11 Regarding the latter, the article identifies an 'expectations gap' in the inconsistency debate and argues that analysts should reject the 'inherited expectation' of 9 Matthew Continetti, 'Whatever happened to the "Responsibility to Protect"?', Weekly Standard, 23 February 2011, http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/whatever-happened-responsibility-protect_552381.html, accessed 12 March 2011. Paris identifies this as one of the five 'structural problems' facing the RtoP, the other four are 'the mixed motives problem; the counterfactual problem; the conspicuous harm problem and the end-state problem'. Roland Paris, 'The "Responsibility to Protect" and the Structural Problems of Preventative Humanitarian Intervention', International Peacekeeping, 21/5: 569-603 (2014).
"never again" and accept the permanency of inconsistency whilst differentiating between legitimate and illegitimate inconsistency to manage expectations accordingly. Fourth, it concludes with an overview but also identifies points to guide future research on this topic.
Previous Research
Within the RtoP discourse, Bellamy has gone as far as to claim 'the 'RtoP is not a single norm but a collection of shared expectations which have different qualities'.
12 At this point, one could make the case that the role of expectations has been discussed extensively precisely because norms represent 'shared expectations… about appropriate behaviour'.
13
From this perspective, the extensive debate over the RtoP within the context of norm life cycle theory and norm contestation could be viewed as a body of work that does in fact analyse the expectations surrounding the RtoP. 14 To be clear, the aim here is not to downplay the importance of such approaches but to draw attention to the fact that 'expectations' are often not referred to, and when they are, they are treated in a vague and conceptually unclear clouding'.
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Essentially, the authors argue that although 'expectations gaps' are well established in political science, they do not fully capture the complexities involved as expectations can be shaped by more than just actors over promising. To explain, 'expectation vacuums' are described as 'the anti-thesis of an "expectations gap"' as these occur when actors fail to 'stimulate interest'. 26 In other words, a lack of demand for a policy or action arises when the actors fail to spark support. Moving on to 'expectation clouding', the authors explain that these arise when actors fail to explain policies which results in an 'expectations cloud' as the policy is unclear. This may be done intentionally or unintentionally and the 
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As Widmaier and Glanville explain, 'too much ambiguity can impede norm development' but, at the same time, 'too little ambiguity can undermine consensus'.
28
Of the two concepts, 'expectation clouding' holds most relevance for the RtoP as real world crises have raised questions which cannot be answered by simply turning to paragraphs 138 and 139 of the World Summit Outcome Document (WSOD). Again, it is worth stressing that this can be a positive thing precisely because ambiguity allows flexibility. As Kennedy's analysis of the UN Charter rightly points out, its architects deliberately used 'language that was adaptable enough to allow application under unforeseen circumstances in years to To return to Evans' mid-life crisis analogy, this cannot be resolved by simply restating the RtoP's intended scope and limits as set out in the WSOD.
Furthermore, although the UN Security-General reports make significant head way in clarifying certain aspects of the RtoP, they cannot cover everything and RtoP expectations will continue to alter within an ever changing political environment.
The fourth concept this article puts forward in relation to expectations management is the idea of 'inherited expectations'. As this is the author's own contribution to the discourse it is necessary to clarify its definition. Inherited expectations refer to expectations that are heavily shaped by a historical tradition. Locating this in the body of Political Science, I draw on the interpretivist view that actors 'construct their beliefs against the background of a tradition'.
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Utilising this logic, it seems evident that historical traditions influence and shape expectations and it is here that the idea of 'inherited expectations' needs to be factored in to future expectation management on mass violence. What may appear to be a new expectation on a contemporary issue may in fact be the heir of a traditional view that continues to shape the discourse. This will be illustrated in more detail through section three's focus on the inherited expectation of "never again".
A final point regards the internal relationship between different types of expectations:
because there has been so little substantive research into expectation management, it will undoubtedly take some time to theorise the interplay between different types of expectations. Furthermore, new concepts will continue to be developed and introduced to the discourse which will further inform our understanding of how different types of expectations interrelate. The call to manage expectations therefore is an attempt to start a conversation on managing RtoP expectations, the need for which is further explained in section two.
RtoP and Expectations
A more thorough engagement with expectations helps us make sense of the RtoP discourse.
Juxtaposing they do not, the RtoP is dead. To return to Hill, this strikes the author as an 'irrational expectation' and we need to develop a more informed understanding of the RtoP that is sensitive to its limitations and possibilities.
In a rare example that explicitly raises the need to manage expectations and specifically expectations gaps, James Finkle analyses the Atrocity Prevention Board under President Obama. Intriguingly, Finkle claims 'managing the expectations -good or bad' were one of the three major obstacles it faced: 34 Given the lofty goal expressed in its title and the complex and controversial issues it deals with, the APB naturally invites outsized expectations and suspicion. Although Ambassador Power has repeatedly cautioned that the "P" in APB does not stand for "panacea," some expected the APB would spearhead an aggressive US policy to stop atrocities in places like Eastern Congo, Sudan and Syria.
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The statement is relevant for two reasons. First, it invokes the idea of an expectations gap.
From the outset the APB was framed in a manner which ratcheted up expectations of what it should achieve without enough consideration given to whether it has the capacity to fulfil this expectation. Second, it highlights the implications of this as some people (again, there is an unclear reference to whose expectations the author is referring to) then judge the success of the APB against this benchmark. Can the same not be said of the RtoP? Moreover, even if the United States had spearheaded such action, Badescu reminds us that complex crisis can dictate that the actor is hindered by inability rather than unwillingness, but that this still causes 'very serious expectation and public perception problems'.
36 Accordingly, as this research agenda moves forward more studies are needed on the relationship between different actor expectations.
In addition, understanding the different types of expectations at play is a necessary step as the Ban Ki-moon campaigned under the slogan 'promise less and deliver more'. 39 The statement reflects a conscious effort by the UN Secretary-General to reduce expectations under the assumption that it is better to over-achieve rather than under-achieve. In so doing, it draws on the sentiment expressed by Hill as one needs to balance expectations with capabilities;
however, simply setting out to lower expectations is a risky approach. As Barnett and Finnemore's reflections on the role of the UN in genocide prevention illustrate, by mid-1993 many actors inside and outside the UN were aware that it was 'trying to do too much, too fast' which they believed undermined the moral authority of the UN. 40 The subsequent scaling back of operations had tragic consequences as, at least in part, this contributed to the failing of the UN in Rwanda the following year. The intention here is not to downplay other factors, but to highlight that reducing expectations can also be harmful. The UN's action over Rwanda represented a failure to uphold the rules embodied in the 1948 Genocide Convention, which eroded the legitimate authority of the UN in the 1990s. 41 The example helps shed light on the need to manage rather than simply lower expectations. The former involves a more complex task of understanding different types of expectations and how they interact within a changing political environment.
In sum, we need to develop a more reasonable set of expectations which are sensitive to what the RtoP can and cannot fulfil. To return to Hill, initially there were 'pre-existing expectations' that surrounded what the EU was set up to achieve, let us call these, a, b, and c.
Critically, over time, more and more was demanded of the EU to the point that it was expected to fulfil a, b, c, d, e, f, g, so on and so on. This is despite the fact that the EU simply did not have the capacity to fulfil all these expectations. at play and different actor expectations. Section three shifts the focus on to one specific debate.
Managing Expectations of Inconsistency
In Roland Paris' analysis of 'the inconsistency problem', he argues that the 'R2P simultaneously symbolizes something larger than the 2005 agreement: it is the embodiment of the pledge to "never again" allow genocide to occur, a commitment born out of the Holocaust'. 43 The statement begins to illustrate the problem of an RtoP expectations gap as despite what was set out in 2005, there is an expectation that the RtoP should do more. To gauge this, the section asks us to consider how the 'inherited expectation' of "never again"
has fuelled this expectations gap. To manage this, we need to reject the "never again" slogan as an 'irrational expectation' and accept the permanency of inconsistency whilst differentiating between legitimate and illegitimate inconsistency.
First and foremost it is necessary to differentiate between what the WSOD actually states and
what RtoP scholars project onto the RtoP within the discourse. Regarding the former, paragraph 139 of the WSOD committed the UNSC to act in a 'timely and decisive manner' on a 'case-by-case basis'. 44 In so doing, it recognised the role of cost-benefit calculations and distanced itself from a one-size-fits-all approach policy. Explaining this case-by-case logic,
Welsh claims, 'a form of inconsistency is built into the very text as a recognition that the Security Council is a political body and must deliberate, and various calculations will come into that decision'. 45 Despite this, sceptics and critics routinely play the inconsistency card as their weapon of choice when attempting to criticise the RtoP. The argument being that since genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing are still taking place in countries such as Syria this is proof that the RtoP is failing to deliver on its stated goals.
To manage expectations, however, a key aspect is to consider how RtoP advocates have also fuelled the expectations gap that surrounds the RtoP. As far as this author is aware, Badescu Because of its breadth, R2P might be perceived as too ambitious. At times, supporters' message about what R2P is able to achieve certainly are, as seen, for example, in Gareth Evans' subtitle to his book on R2P, "ending mass atrocity crimes once and for all" (2008a). The R2P framework is not going to be able to achieve this goal, no matter how morally satisfactory it sounds. Such arguments then, risk to be stamped as wishful thinking, just as the postHolocaust "never again" dictum proved to be.
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The statement captures the idea that advocates such as Evans have, at times, been guilty of increasing the demand side of the RtoP to the point that it outstrips the supply side. The idea of 'ending all mass violence' is, of course, somewhat of an aspirational statement.
Furthermore, speaking in 2007 Evans clarified that he was not expecting an end to all 'deadly conflict' within his life time, 'But no more Holocausts, Cambodias, Rwandas, or Srebrenicas?
Surely that's not only thinkable, but doable'.
47 From this perspective, mass violence is 'the problem' and the RtoP is 'the solution'. Evans portrays his 2008 book as being about "the way in which the world has at least started to answer that question and to take the steps necessary to ensure that we will never again have to say "never again"'. 48 The statement is important because it illustrates two things. First, despite the idea that RtoP represents the solution, he acknowledges that it remains a work in progress. This is something that sceptics and critics need to recognise. Second, we begin to see the idea that the RtoP can end mass violence such as the Holocaust extended to the point that it can end all mass violence.
It is here that I introduce the idea of inherited expectations and the implications of these for the RtoP. Despite the wording of the WSOD, the legacy of the Holocaust casts a large shadow over the RtoP discourse through the "never again" rhetoric. 49 To be clear on this, the problem is not so much the idea of "never again" another Holocaust, but the fact that this spilt over in to the expectation of "never again" any form of mass violence. Reviewing the Of all my aims as Secretary-General, there is none to which I feel more deeply committed than that of enabling the United Nations never again to fail in protecting a civilian population from genocide or mass slaughter.
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The moral outcry is understandable as people want to shout out "no more Holocausts, no more Rwanda's". It can also be tactical, for example, one may speak of 'making poverty history' without really expecting to achieve this goal; however, this ratchets up expectations of what the RtoP can and should do. According to the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) report, 'There must never again be mass killing or ethnic cleansing' 51 , or to take another example, reflecting on the anniversary of the Rwandan genocide, the UNA-UK released a report entitled 'Never Again?' claiming '20 years on, people are still being massacred'. 52 Essentially, if this was a war, military leaders would speak of 'mission creep'. To return to Paris, we can see that the interplay between expectations helps explain why the RtoP symbolizes more than was agreed on in 2005 as the 'inherited expectation' of "never again" fuels the 'expectations gap' that surrounds the RtoP.
The problem is that the RtoP is then judged by this benchmark. For example, following the crisis in Darfur, which is often cited as the first 'test-case' of the RtoP, Nick Grono argued, 'until the first ethnic cleansing campaign of the twenty-first century is reversed, RtoP will remain aspirational, not operational, and "never again" will be "yet again" once again'.
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Therefore despite the fact that the WSOD institutionalised inconsistency, it is often judged by the "never again" benchmark which, it inherited, and to this day, continues to be projected onto the RtoP. Reform, a UN reaction force and an independent judicial body to oversee decision making. 61 This would help overcome the problem of inconsistency as an independent body free of the inherent national biases of the P5 would oversee decision making. To take another example, Roff calls for establishing an international RtoP Institution that would act as an independent international body (based on the model of National Human Rights Institutions at the domestic level) to hold both states and the United Nations accountable regarding how they fulfil their RtoP. 62 Notably, both of these normative appeals call for a significant reworking of the current world order and, in so doing, raise two relevant points. First, even if such reforms are achieved, it is highly doubtful that these would end mass violence once and for all. This is not to suggest that these authors claim such reforms would end mass violence entirely, but to simply re-enforce that the idea of saying "never again" to all mass violence is a fallacy. In other words, it is not so much the 'permanency of inconsistency' that is the problem as there can be an inconsistent yet coherent approach. It is the persistence of genuine duplicity or at least the perception of it, which continues to plague the RtoP. Debates will undoubtedly continue over whether reforms such as those set out above are in fact possible. The pressing point here is that a more reasonable expectation is that there will be less mass violence, rather than none, in a post-RtoP world.
Conclusion
The article advances an understanding of the RtoP that is inherently more sensitive to its groundwork for future studies: expectation gaps, expectation vacuums, expectation clouding and inherited expectations -the latter is the author's own contribution to the debate. To evidence the utility of these concepts, the article provided a brief overview in section two, prior to a more specific engagement with the debate over inconsistency. The article identifies an 'expectations gap' in the inconsistency debate and argues that analysts should reject the 'inherited expectation' of "never again" and accept the permanency of inconsistency whilst differentiating between legitimate and illegitimate inconsistency to manage expectations accordingly.
In closing, this author identifies three points to guide new research in this area. First, there is significant work to be done on the expectation management of other key RtoP debates such as prevention, the expansion of the concept, gender security, the responsibility to rebuild, and the RtoPs relationship with the International Criminal Court -to name just a few. For example, the need for a 'gender lens' asks us to reassess RtoP expectations regarding 'sexual and gender based violence'. 73 Unfortunately, this remains somewhat of a peripheral in the discourse. Second, it is evident that there are complex internal relations between different types of expectations. The article has drawn attention to the relationship between expectation gaps and expectation clouds as well as expectation gaps and inherited expectations, but there is clearly much more needed on the dynamics at play. The Political Scientists who study expectations only seem to be beginning to get to grips with this issue. Moreover, as new types of expectations are identified and introduced to the discourse they will feedback into the interplay between different types of expectations. Third, it is clear that the expectations of different actors need to be addressed in much more detail as we unpack the notion of 'shared expectations' through a focus on states, policymakers, NGOs, civil society groups, victims, perpetrators, bystanders, think tanks, journalists and so forth. It is imperative that RtoP scholars gain a more informed understanding of how these expectations are shaped within a changing political landscape and the implications that stem from them. Fourth, this needs to feed into studies on norms more. As aforementioned, the focus on expectations is meant to compliment not compete which studies on norms. This article helps lays the groundwork, but much more is needed as the RtoP enters its second decade since the WSOD.
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